by Eustace Mullins
CHAPTER ELEVEN
The collaboration between Benjamin
Strong and Lord Montagu Norman is one of the greatest secrets of the
twentieth century. Benjamin Strong married the daughter of the president
of Bankers Trust in New York, and subsequently succeeded to its
presidency. Carroll Quigley, in Tragedy and Hope says: "Strong became
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the joint nominee of
Morgan and of Kuhn, Loeb Company in 1914."87
Lord Montagu Norman is the only man in history who had
both his maternal grandfather and his paternal grandfather serve as
Governors of the Bank of England. His father was with Brown, Shipley
Company, the London Branch of Brown Brothers (now Brown Brothers
Harriman). Montagu Norman (1871-1950) came to New York to work for Brown
Brothers in 1894, where he was befriended by the Delano family, and by
James Markoe, of Brown Brothers. He returned to England, and in 1907 was
named to the Court of the Bank of England. In 1912, he had a nervous
breakdown, and went to Switzerland to be treated by Jung, as was
fashionable among the powerful group which he represented.*
Lord Montagu Norman was Governor of the Bank of
England from 1916 to 1944. During this period, he participated in the
central bank conferences which set up the Crash of 1929 and a worldwide
depression. In The Politics of Money by Brian Johnson, he writes,
"Strong and Norman, intimate friends, spent their holidays together at
Bar Harbour and in the South of France." Johnson says, "Norman therefore
became Strong's alter ego. . . . "Strong's easy money policies on the
New York money market from 1925-28 were the fulfillment of his agreement
with Norman to keep New York interest rates below those of London. For
the sake of international cooperation, Strong withheld the steadying
hand of high interest rates from New York until it was too late. Easy
money in New York had encouraged the surging American boom of the late
1920s, with its fantastic heights of speculation."88
Benjamin Strong died suddenly in 1928. The New York
Times obituary, Oct. 17, 1928, describes the conference between the
directors of the three great central banks in Europe in July, 1927, "Mr.
Norman, Bank of England, Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank,
and Dr. Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, their meeting referred to at
the time as a meeting of 'the world's most exclusive club'. No public
reports were ever made of the foreign conferences, which were wholly
informal, but which covered many important questions of gold movements,
the stability of world trade, and world economy."
The meetings at which the future of the world's
economy are decided are always reported as being "wholly informal", off
the record, no reports made to the public, and on the rare occasions
when outraged Congressmen summon these mystery figures to testify about
their activities they merely trace the outline of steps taken, and
develop no information about what was really said or decided.
At the Senate Hearings on the Federal Reserve System
in 1931, H. Parker Willis, one of the authors and First Secretary of the
Federal Reserve Board from 1914 until 1920, pointedly asked Governor
George Harrison, Strong's successor as Governor of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York:
"What is the relationship between the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the money committee of the Stock
Exchange?"
"There is no relationship," Governor Harrison
replied.
"There is no assistance or cooperation in fixing the
rate in any way?", asked Willis.
"No," said Governor Harrison, "although on various
occasions they advise us of the state of the money situation, and what
they think the rate ought to be."
This was an absolute contradiction of his statement
that "There is no relationship". The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
which set the discount rate for the other Reserve Banks, actually
maintained a close liaison with the money committee of the Stock
Exchange.
The House Stabilization Hearings of 1928 proved
conclusively that the Governors of the Federal Reserve System had been
holding conferences with heads of the big European central banks. Even
had the Congressmen known the details of the plot which was to culminate
in the Great Depression of 1929-31, there would have been nothing they
could have done to stop it. The international bankers who controlled
gold movements could inflict their will on any country, and the United
States was as helpless as any other.
Notes from these House Hearings follow:
MR. BEEDY: "I notice on your chart that the lines
which produce the most violent fluctuations are found under 'Money
Rates in New York.' As the rates of money rise and fall in the big
cities the loans that are made on investments seem to take advantage
of them, at present, a quite violent change, while industry in general
does not seem to avail itself of these violent changes, and that line
is fairly even, there being no great rises or declines.
GOVERNOR ADOLPH MILLER: This was all more or less in
the interests of the international situation. They sold gold credits
in New York for sterling balances in London.
REPRESENTATIVE STRONG: (No relation to Benjamin):
Has the Federal Reserve Board the power to attract gold to this
country?
E.A. GOLDENWEISER, research director for the Board:
The Federal Reserve Board could attract gold to this country by making
money rates higher.
GOVERNOR ADOLPH MILLER: I think we are very close to
the point where any further solicitude on our part for the monetary
concerns of Europe can be altered. The Federal Reserve Board last
summer, 1927, set out by a policy of open market purchases, followed
in course by reduction on the discount rate at the Reserve Banks, to
ease the credit situation and to cheapen the cost of money. The
official reasons for that departure in credit policy were that it
would help to stabilize international exchange and stimulate the
exportation of gold.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Will you tell us briefly how that
matter was brought to the Federal Reserve Board and what were the
influences that went into the final determination?
GOVERNOR ADOLPH MILLER: You are asking a question
impossible for me to answer.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Perhaps I can clarify it--where
did the suggestion come from that caused this decision of the change
of rates last summer?
GOVERNOR ADOLPH MILLER: The three largest central
banks in Europe had sent representatives to this country. There were
the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Hjalmar Schacht, and
Professor Rist, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France. These gentlemen
were in conference with officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. After a week or two, they appeared in Washington for the better
part of a day. They came down the evening of one day and were the
guests of the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board the following
day, and left that afternoon for New York.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Were the members of the Board
present at this luncheon?
GOVERNOR ADOLPH MILLER: Oh, yes, it was given by the
Governors of the Board for the purpose of bringing all of us together.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Was it a social affair, or were
matters of importance discussed?
GOVERNOR MILLER: I would say it was mainly a social
affair. Personally, I had a long conversation with Dr. Schacht alone
before the luncheon, and also one of considerable length with
Professor Rist. After the luncheon I began a conversation with Mr.
Norman, which was joined in by Governor Strong of New York.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Was that a formal meeting of the
Board?
GOVERNOR ADOLPH MILLER: No.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: It was just an informal
discussion of the matters they had been discussing in New York?
GOVERNOR MILLER: I assume so. It was mainly a social
occasion. What I said was mainly in the nature of generalities. The
heads of these central banks also spoke in generalities.
MR. KING: What did they want?
GOVERNOR MILLER: They were very candid in answers to
questions. I wanted to have a talk with Mr. Norman, and we both stayed
behind after luncheon, and were joined by the other foreign
representatives and the officials of the New York Reserve Bank. These
gentlemen were all pretty concerned with the way the gold standard was
working. They were therefore desirous of seeing an easy money market
in New York and lower rates, which would deter gold from moving from
Europe to this country. That would be very much in the interest of the
international money situation which then existed.
MR. BEEDY: Was there some understanding arrived at
between the representatives of these foreign banks and the Federal
Reserve Board or the New York Federal Reserve Bank?
GOVERNOR MILLER: Yes.
MR. BEEDY: It was not reported formally?
GOVERNOR MILLER: No. Later, there came a meeting of
the Open-Market Policy Committee, the investment policy committee of
the Federal Reserve System, by which and to which certain
recommendations were made. My recollection is that about eighty
million dollars worth of securities were purchased in August
consistent with this plan.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Was there any conference between
the members of the Open Market Committee and those bankers from
abroad?
GOVERNOR MILLER: They may have met them as
individuals, but not as a committee.
MR. KING: How does the Open-Market Committee get its
ideas?
GOVERNOR MILLER: They sit around and talk about it.
I do not know whose idea this was. It was distinctly a time in which
there was a cooperative spirit at work.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: You have outlined here
negotiations of very great importance.
GOVERNOR MILLER: I should rather say conversations.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Something of a very definite
character took place?
GOVERNOR MILLER: Yes.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: A change of policy on the part of
our whole financial system which has resulted in one of the most
unusual situations that has ever confronted this country financially
(the stock market speculation boom of 1927-1929). It seems to me that
a matter of that importance should have been made a matter of record
in Washington.
GOVERNOR MILLER: I agree with you.
REPRESENTATIVE STRONG: Would it not have been a good
thing if there had been a direction that those powers given to the
Federal Reserve System should be used for the continued stabilization
of the purchasing power of the American dollar rather than be
influenced by the interests of Europe?
GOVERNOR MILLER: I take exception to that term
"influence". Besides, there is no such thing as stabilizing the
American dollar without stabilizing every other gold currency. They
are tied together by the gold standard. Other eminent men who come
here are very adroit in knowing how to approach the folk who make up
the personnel of the Federal Reserve Board.
MR. STEAGALL: The visit of these foreign bankers
resulted in money being cheaper in New York?
GOVERNOR MILLER: Yes, exactly.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: I would like to put in the record
all who attended that luncheon in Washington.
GOVERNOR MILLER: In addition to the names I have
given you, there was also present one of the younger men from the Bank
of France. I think all members of the Federal Reserve Board were
there. Under Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills was there, and the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Schuneman, also, two or three
men from the State Department and Mr. Warren of the Foreign Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Oh yes, Governor Strong was
present.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: This conference, of course, with
all of these foreign bankers did not just happen. The prominent
bankers from Germany, France, and England came here at whose
suggestion?
GOVERNOR MILLER: A situation had been created that
was distinctly embarrassing to London by reason of the impending
withdrawal of a certain amount of gold which had been recovered by
France and that had originally been shipped and deposited in the Bank
of England by the French Government as a war credit. There was getting
to be some tension of mind in Europe because France was beginning to
put her house in order for a return to the gold standard. This
situation was one which called for some moderating influence.
MR. KING: Who was the moving spirit who got those
people together?
GOVERNOR MILLER: That is a detail with which I am
not familiar.
REPRESENTATIVE STRONG: Would it not be fair to say
that the fellows who wanted the gold were the ones who instigated the
meeting?
GOVERNOR MILLER: They came over here.
REPRESENTATIVE STRONG: The fact is that they came
over here, they had a meeting, they banqueted, they talked, they got
the Federal Reserve Board to lower the discount rate, and to make the
purchases in the open market, and they got the gold.
MR. STEAGALL: Is it true that action stabilized the
European currencies and upset ours?
GOVERNOR MILLER: Yes, that was what it was intended
to do.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: Let me call your attention to the
recent conference in Paris at which Mr. Goldenweiser, director of
research for the Federal Reserve Board, and Dr. Burgess, assistant
Federal Reserve Agent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were in
consultation with the representatives of the other central banks. Who
called the conference?
GOVERNOR MILLER: My recollection is that it was
called by the Bank of France.
GOVERNOR YOUNG: No, it was the League of Nations who
called them together."
The secret meeting between the Governors of the
Federal Reserve Board and the heads of the European central banks was
not called to stabilize anything. It was held to discuss the best way of
getting the gold held in the United States by the System back to Europe
to force the nations of that continent back on the gold standard. The
League of Nations had not yet succeeded in doing that, the objective for
which that body was set up in the first place, because the Senate of the
United States had refused to let Woodrow Wilson betray us to an
international monetary authority. It took the Second World War and
Franklin D. Roosevelt to do that. Meanwhile, Europe had to have our gold
and the Federal Reserve System gave it to them, five hundred million
dollars worth. The movement of that gold out of the United States caused
the deflation of the stock boom, the end of the business prosperity of
the 1920s and the Great Depression of 1929-31, the worst calamity which
has ever befallen this nation. It is entirely logical to say that the
American people suffered that depression as a punishment for not joining
the League of Nations. The bankers knew what would happen when that five
hundred million dollars worth of gold was sent to Europe. They wanted
the Depression because it put the business and finance of the United
States in their hands.
The Hearings continue:
MR. BEEDY: "Mr. Ebersole of the Treasury Department
concluded his remarks at the dinner we attended last night by saying
that the Federal Reserve System did not want stabilization and the
American businessman did not want it. They want these fluctuations in
prices, not only in securities but in commodities, in trade generally,
because those who are now in control are making their profits out of
that very instability. If control of these people does not come in a
legitimate way, there may be an attempt to produce it by general
upheavals such as have characterized society in days gone by.
Revolutions have been promoted by dissatisfaction with existing
conditions, the control being in the hands of the few, and the many
paying the bills.
CHAIRMAN MCFADDEN: I have here a letter from a
member of the Federal Reserve Board who was summoned to appear here. I
would like to have it put in the record. It is from Governor
Cunningham:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
For the past several weeks I have been confined to
my home on account of illness and am now preparing to spend a few
weeks away from Washington for the purpose of hastening convalescence.
Edward H. Cunningham
This is in answer to an invitation extended him to
appear before our Committee. I also have a letter from George
Harrison, Deputy Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
My Dear Mr. Congressman:
Governor Strong sailed for Europe last week. He had
not been at all well since the first of the year, and, while he did
appear before your Committee last March, it was only shortly after
that that he suffered a very severe attack of shingles, which has
sorely racked his nerves.
George L. Harrison, May 19, 1928
I also desire to place in the record a statement in
the New York Journal of Commerce, dated May 22, 1928, from Washington:
'It is stated in well-informed circles here that the
chief topic being taken up by Governor Strong of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York on his present visit to Paris is the arrangement of
stabilization credits for France, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. A second
vital question Mr. Strong will take up is the amount of gold France is
to draw from this country.'"
Further questioning by Chairman McFadden about the
strange illness of Benjamin Strong brought forth the following testimony
from Governor Charles S. Hamlin of the Federal Reserve Board on May
23rd, 1928:
"All I know is that Governor Strong has been very
ill, and he has gone over to Europe primarily, I understand, as a
matter of health. Of course, he knows well the various offices of the
European central banks and undoubtedly will call on them."
Governor Benjamin Strong died a few weeks after his
return from Europe, without appearing before the Committee.
The purpose of these hearings before the House
Committee on Banking and Currency in 1928 was to investigate the
necessity for passing the Strong bill, presented by Representative
Strong (no relation to Benjamin, the international banker), which would
have provided that the Federal Reserve System be empowered to act to
stabilize the purchasing power of the dollar. This had been one of the
promises made by Carter Glass and Woodrow Wilson when they presented the
Federal Reserve Act before Congress in 1912, and such a provision had
actually been put in the Act by Senator Robert L. Owen, but Carter
Glass' House Committee on Banking and Currency had struck it out. The
traders and speculators did not want the dollar to become stable,
because they would no longer be able to make a profit. The citizens of
this country had been led to gamble on the stock market in the 1920s
because the traders had created a nationwide condition of instability.
The Strong Bill of 1928 was defeated in Congress.
The financial situation in the United States during
the 1920s was characterized by an inflation of speculative values only.
It was a trader-made situation. Prices of commodities remained low,
despite the over-pricing of securities on the exchange.
The purchasers did not expect their securities to pay
dividends. The idea was to hold them awhile and sell them at a profit.
It had to stop somewhere, as Paul Warburg remarked in March, 1929. Wall
Street did not let it stop until the people had put their savings into
these over-priced securities. We had the spectacle of the President of
the United States, Calvin Coolidge, acting as a shill for the stock
market operators when he recommended to the American people that they
continue buying on the market, in 1927. There had been uneasiness about
the inflated condition of the market, and the bankers showed their power
by getting the President of the United States, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to issue statements that brokers' loans were not too
high, and that the condition of the stock market was sound.
Irving Fisher warned us in 1927 that the burden of
stabilizing prices all over the world would soon fall on the United
States. One of the results of the Second World War was the establishment
of an International Monetary Fund to do just that. Professor Gustav
Cassel remarked in the same year that:
"The downward movement of prices has not been a
spontaneous result of forces beyond our control. It is the result of a
policy deliberately framed to bring down prices and give a higher
value to the monetary unit."
The Democratic Party, after passing the Federal
Reserve Act and leading us into the First World War, assumed the role of
an opposition party during the 1920s. They were on the outside of the
political fence, and were supported during those lean years by liberal
handouts from Bernard Baruch, according to his biography. How far
outside of it they were and how little chance they had in 1928, is shown
by a plank in the official Democratic Party platform adopted at Houston
on June 28, 1928:
"The administration of the Federal Reserve System
for the advantage of the stock-market speculators should cease. It
must be administered for the benefit of farmers, wage-earners,
merchants, manufacturers, and others engaged in constructive
business."
This idealism insured defeat for its protagonist, Al
Smith, who was nominated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The campaign against
Al Smith also was marked by appeals to religious intolerance, because he
was a Catholic. The bankers stirred up anti-Catholic sentiment all over
the country to achieve the election of their World War I protégé,
Herbert Hoover.
Instead of being used to promote the financial
stability of the country, as had been promised by Woodrow Wilson when
the Act was passed, financial instability has been steadily promoted by
the Federal Reserve Board. An official memorandum issued by the Board on
March 13, 1939, stated that:
"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System opposes any bill which proposes a stable price level."
Politically, the Federal Reserve Board was used to
advance the election of the bankers' candidates during the 1920s. The
"Literary Digest" on August 4, 1928, said, on the occasion of the
Federal Reserve Board raising the rate to five percent in a Presidential
year:
"This reverses the politically desirable cheap money
policy of 1927, and gives smooth conditions on the stock market. It
was attacked by the Peoples' Lobby of Washington, D.C. which said that
'This increase at a time when farmers needed cheap money to finance
the harvesting of their crops was a direct blow at the farmers, who
had begun to get back on their feet after the Agricultural Depression
of 1920-21.
"The New York World" said on that occasion:
"Criticism of Federal Reserve Board policy by many
investors is not based on its attempt to deflate the stock market, but
on the charge that the Board itself, by last year's policy, is
completely responsible for such stock market inflation as exists."
A damning survey of the Federal Reserve System's first
fifteen years appears in the "North American Review" of May, 1929, by H.
Parker Willis, professional economist who was one of the authors of the
Act and First Secretary of the Board from 1914 until 1920. He expresses
complete disillusionment.
"My first talk with President-elect Wilson was in
1912. Our conversation related entirely to banking reform. I asked
whether he felt confident we could secure the administration of a
suitable law and how we should get it applied and enforced. He
answered: 'We must rely on American business idealism.' He sought for
something which could be trusted to afford opportunity to American
Idealism. It did serve to finance the World War and to revise American
banking practices. The element of idealism that the President
prescribed and believed we could get on the principle of noblesse
oblige from American bankers and businessmen was not there. Since the
inauguration of the Federal Reserve Act we have suffered one of the
most serious financial depressions and revolutions ever known in our
history, that of 1920-21. We have seen our agriculture pass through a
long period of suffering and even of revolution, during which one
million farmers left their farms, due to difficulties with the price
of land and the odd status of credit conditions. We have suffered the
most extensive era of bank failures ever known in this country.
Forty-five hundred banks have closed their doors since the Reserve
System began functioning. In some Western towns there have been times
when all banks in that community failed, and given banks have failed
over and over again. There has been little difference in liability to
failure between members and non-members of the Federal Reserve System.
"Wilson's choice of the first members of the Federal
Reserve Board was not especially happy. They represented a composite
group chosen for the express purpose of placating this, that, or the
other big interest. It was not strange that appointees used their
places to pay debts. When the Board was considering a resolution to
the effect that future members of the reserve system should be
appointed solely on merit, because of the demonstrated incompetence of
some of their number. Comptroller John Skelton Williams moved to
strike out the word 'solely' and in this he was sustained by the
Board. The inclusion of certain elements (Warburg, Strauss, etc.) in
the Board gave an opportunity for catering to special interests that
was to prove disastrous later on.
"President Wilson erred, as he often erred, in
supposing that the holding of an important office would transform an
incumbent and revivify his patriotism. The Reserve Board reached the
low ebb of the Wilson period with the appointment of a member who was
chosen for his ability to get delegates for a Democratic candidate for
the Presidency. However, this level was not the dregs reached under
President Harding. He appointed an old crony, D.R. Crissinger, as
Governor of the Board, and named several other super-serviceable
politicians to other places. Before his death he had done his utmost
to debauch the whole undertaking. The System has gone steadily
downhill ever since.
"Reserve Banks had hardly assumed their first form
when it became apparent that local bankers had sought to use them as a
means of taking care of 'favorite sons', that is, persons who had by
common consent become a kind of general charge upon the banking
community, or inefficients of various kinds. When reserve directors
were to be chosen, the country bankers often refused to vote, or, when
they voted, cast their ballots as directed by city correspondents. In
these circumstances popular or democratic control of reserve banks was
out of the question.
Reasonable efficiency might have been secured if
honest men, recognizing their public duty, had assumed power. If such
men existed, they did not get on the Federal Reserve Board. In one
reserve bank today the chief management is in the hands of a man who
never did a day's actual banking in his life, while in another reserve
institution both Governor and Chairman are the former heads of now
defunct banks. They naturally have a high failure record in their
district. In a majority of districts the standard of performance as
judged by good banking standards is disgracefully low among reserve
executive officials. The policy of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia is known in the System as the 'Friends and Relatives
Banks.'
"It was while making war profits in considerable
amounts that someone conceived the idea of using the profits to
provide themselves with phenomenally costly buildings. Today the
Reserve Banks must keep a full billion dollars of their money
constantly at work merely to pay their own expenses in normal times.
"The best illustration of what the System has done
and not done is offered by the experience which the country was having
with speculation, in May, 1929. Three years prior to that, the present
bull market was just getting under way. In the autumn of 1926 a group
of bankers, among them one of world famous name, were sitting at a
table in a Washington hotel. One of them raised the question whether
the low discount rates of the System were not likely to encourage
speculation.
"'Yes', replied the famous banker, 'they will, but
that cannot be helped. It is the price we must pay for helping
Europe.'
"It may well be questioned whether the encouragement
of speculation by the Board has been the price paid for helping Europe
or whether it is the price paid to induce a certain class of
financiers to help Europe, but in either case European conditions
should not have had anything to do with the Board's discount policy.
The fact of the matter is that the Federal Reserve Banks do not come
into contact with the community.
"The 'small man' from Maine to Texas has gradually
been led to invest his savings in the stock market, with the result
that the rising tide of speculation, transacted at a higher and higher
rate of speed, has swept over the legitimate business of the country.
"In March, 1928, Roy A. Young, Governor of the
Board, was called before a Senate committee.
'Do you think the brokers' loans are too high?", he
was asked.
"'I am not prepared to say whether brokers' loans
are too high or too low,' he replied, 'but I am sure they are safely
and conservatively made.'
"Secretary of the Treasury Mellon in a formal
statement assured the country that they were not too high, and
Coolidge, using material supplied him by the Federal Reserve Board,
made a plain statement to the country that they were not too high. The
Federal Reserve Board, charged with the duty of protecting the
interests of the average man, thus did its utmost to assure the
average man that he should feel no alarm about his savings. Yet the
Federal Reserve Board issued on February 2, 1929, a letter addressed
to the Reserve Bank Directors cautioning them against grave danger of
further speculation.
"What could be expected from a group of men such as
composed the Board, a set of men who were solely interested in
standing from under when there was any danger of friction, displaying
a bovine and canine appetite for credit and praise, while eager only
to 'stand in' with the 'big men' whom they know as the masters of
American finance and banking?"
H. Parker Willis omitted any reference to Lord
Montague Norman and the machinations of the Bank of England which were
about to result in the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.
NOTES:
* When people of this class are stricken by guilt
feelings while plotting world wars and economic depressions which will
bring misery, suffering and death to millions of the world's
inhabitants, they sometimes have qualms. These qualms are jeered at by
their peers as "a failure of nerve". After a bout with their
psychiatrists, they return to their work with renewed gusto, with no
further digressions of pity for "the little people" who are to be their
victims.
87 Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, Macmillan, New
York, p. 326
88 Brian Johnson, The Politics of Money, McGraw Hill, New York, 1970, p.
63.
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