Citizen Spook
Monday, August 8, 2005
[UPDATED August 8, 2005 10:35 p.m. Typos have been
corrected. New substantive additions have been added in red
type.]
The Attorney General, Acting Attorney General or any other officer of the
Department of Justice has NO LEGAL AUTHORITY to remove Special Counsel
Fitzgerald from the Treasongate investigation or prosecution-- AND --
President Bush does NOT have the legal authority to fire Patrick
Fitzgerald in his capacity as "Special Counsel".
Analysis of federal law (involved with both the appointment of -- and
authority granted to -- Special Counsel Fitzgerald), Comey's press
conference of December 30th, 2003, and
Decision B-302582 (September 30, 2004) issued by the Government
Accountability Office, leads to the following legal conclusions:
1. James Comey, in his capacity as Acting Attorney
General, with respect to the Justice Department's investigation into
"the alleged unauthorized disclosure of a CIA employee's identity"
(hereinafter "Treasongate"), delegated his plenary authority to Special
Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 508, 509, 510, and
515, conferring upon him "all of the authority of the Attorney General"
thereby transferring his status as Acting Attorney General, in this
matter, to Fitzgerald.
2. Special Counsel Fitzgerald is not serving as an "outside Special
Counsel" pursuant to 28 USA § 600, so the provisions of that code are
not applicable in this matter nor do they have any legal effect over
Fitzgerald's investigation and/or prosecution.
3. While President Bush may fire or replace Fitzgerald as the "US
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois", the President has NO
AUTHORITY to fire him as the "Special Counsel" in the Treasongate
investigation.
Fitzgerald wears the following two hats:
1. US Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
2. Special Counsel in the Treasongate investigation "Acting" with the
full authority of the US Attorney General.
We aspire to be a nation of laws. The Constitution was our
protection from tyranny, but the dying document now faces its greatest
challenge fighting off a disease so insidious its sickness threatens a
global plague of bloodshed and repression.
From the draconian provisions of the Patriot Act, which allows federal
agents to sneak into our homes without a warrant or probable cause, to the
expanding psyops of horrific murder and torture of men, women and children
who haven't been given a scintilla of due process in their own sovereign
land which we invaded based upon fake evidence, our laws are riddled with
a malignant cancer.
Who will stand up for the law when the law is beaten and abused? Who will
stand up for the guardians of the law when the guardians are beaten and
abused?
As you will soon see, Fitzgerald's appointment as Special Counsel, the
first of its kind in the history of the United States, was meticulously
crafted to withstand the coming onslaught.
Speculation is running rampant as to whether Patrick Fitzgerald and his
grand jury investigation will be shut down by Bush administration
operatives. You may believe that Bush cannot risk the political fallout
associated with removing Fitzgerald, but his team of fascist criminals
will shoot first and ask questions...never.
These are the same people who carefully calculated they could openly
commit Treason by outing Valerie Plame and her CIA network. They weren't
worried about the fallout then, and they won't be worried about it now.
It's not political fallout that will prevent the Bush death squad from
removing Fitzgerald; their obstacle is the law. It doesn't matter whether
they put all of Skull and Bones in the Justice Department and relocate the
DOJ to a tomb in New Haven, the law protects Patrick Fitzgerald's mandate
from all intervention. Neither Bush nor his Justice Department cronies
have the legal authority to remove Fitzgerald as Special Counsel or to
prematurely end his grand jury. You can thank James Comey for this.
Comey's brilliant nuances involved with US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald's
appointment as "Special Counsel" are nothing short of genius. The
foresight of Acting Attorney General Comey's "delegation of authority" to
Fitzgerald will go down in history as one of the most stunning and
brilliant acts of non-partisan patriotism this nation has ever seen.
I do not throw these words out lightly.
Federal regulations and decisions, germane to Fitzgerald's unique
appointment, legally protect the integrity of the Special Counsel's
unrestricted mandate from interference by political operatives in this
investigation, an investigation to which Acting Attorney General James
Comey (empowered as such by Attorney General John Ashcroft's recusal)
provided unprecedented patriotic and non-partisan foresight.
Furthermore, Fitzgerald was empowered by Comey with unilateral authority
to "expand" his jurisdiction and "pursue it wherever he wants to pursue
it". Let your imagination run wild because it's all legally in play.
THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL PATRICK FITZGERALD
On December 30th, 2003, Deputy Attorney General James Comey held a
press conference wherein he announced that Attorney General John
Ashcroft had recused himself, on that day, from all involvement with the
Treasongate investigation. Comey stated that the recusal included all of
Ashcroft's "staff" and that "a document was created ...that memorialized
the recusal."
Comey announced:
"By
that act, I automatically become the acting attorney general for
purposes of this case with authority to determine how the case is
investigated, and if warranted by the evidence, prosecuted."
Comey went on to say:
"[P]rior
to his recusal, the attorney general and I agreed that it was
appropriate to appoint a special counsel [read: special prosecutor] from
outside our normal chain of command to oversee this investigation.
By his recusal, of course, the attorney general left to
me the decision about how to choose a counsel, who that person should be
and what that person's mandate should be...effective immediately, the
United States attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Patrick J.
Fitzgerald, will serve as special counsel in charge of this matter."
Fitzgerald's authority was conferred from Comey to him via
two official Justice Department notification letters. The first
letter was issued on December 30, 2003. It stated:
"By the authority vested in the Attorney General by law,
including 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 515, and in my capacity as Acting
Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 508, I hereby delegate to you all
the authority of the Attorney General with respect to the Department's
investigation into the alleged unauthorized disclosure of a CIA
employee's identity, and I direct you to exercise that authority as
Special Counsel independent of the supervision or control of any officer
of the Department."
At the December 30 press conference, Comey further stated:
"Fitzgerald...does not have to come back to me for
anything...I've told him, our instructions are: You have this authority;
I've delegated to you all the approval authority that I as attorney
general have. You can exercise it as you see fit.
And a U.S. attorney or a normal outside counsel would
have to go through the approval process to get permission to appeal
something. Fitzgerald would not because of the broad grant of authority
I've given him.
So, in short, I have essentially given him -- not
essentially -- I have given him all the approval authorities that rest
-- that are inherent in the attorney general; something that does not
happen with an outside special counsel."
Before we analyze the provisions of the law which enables
this transfer of power, please note that Comey removed all "supervision or
control of any officer of the Department" while also conferring "all the
approval authority" that Comey, "as Attorney General" had.
From the December 30th press conference:
"Q: You mentioned that the -- you felt that Fitzgerald
will have a broader -- actually a broader mandate, broader abilities
than an outside counsel. Can you expand on that a little bit? In what
respect will he have a --
MR. COMEY: Yes. An outside counsel has a -- the regulations prescribe a
number of ways in which they're very similar to a U.S. attorney. For
example, they have to follow all Department of Justice policies
regarding approvals. So that means if they want to subpoena a member of
the media, if they want to grant immunity, if they want to subpoena a
lawyer -- all the things that we as U.S. attorneys have to get approval
for, an outside counsel has to come back to the Department of Justice.
An outside counsel also only gets the jurisdiction that is assigned to
him and no other. The regulations provide that if he or she wants to
expand that jurisdiction, they have to come back to the attorney general
and get permission.
Fitzgerald has been told, as I said to you: Follow the facts; do the
right thing. He can pursue it wherever he wants to pursue it."
On February 6, 2004,
a second official letter was sent to Fitzgerald by Comey. This second
letter (as well as the first) was discussed in
Decision B-302582 issued by the Government Accountability Office
(hereinafter GAO) on September 30, 2004. (The GAO Decision paper was
drafted in relation to oversight of appropriations granted to Fitzgerald's
office for the investigation. This is discussed in detail below).
The GAO quoted Comey's second letter to Fitzgerald as follows:
"In February 2004, Acting Attorney General Comey
clarified Special Counsel Fitzgerald's delegation of authority to state
that the authority previously delegated to him is plenary. It also
states, 'Further, my conferral on you of the title of Special Counsel'
in this matter should not be misunderstood to suggest that your position
and authorities are defined and limited by 28 CFR Part 600.'
[4]"
Comey went to great lengths to shield Fitzgerald from the
restrictions of
28 CFR Part 600. These regulations, enacted by former Attorney General
Janet Reno, demand that an "outside Special Counsel" submit his
investigation to various oversight by others in the Justice Department.
Please note, because it's a major point of confusion, that Patrick
Fitzgerald is not an "outside Special Counsel". To many it has appeared
that way, but such an assumption is completely erroneous. Comey nullified
the Part 600 regulations by delegating all of his authority using "other
law", and the GAO unconditionally agreed such a delegation of authority
was legal and proper:
"The parameters of his authority and independence are
defined in the appointment letters which delegate to Special Counsel
Fitzgerald all (plenary) the authority of the Attorney General with
respect to the Department's investigation into the alleged unauthorized
disclosure of a CIA employee's identity with the direction that he
exercise such authority independent of the supervision or control of any
officer of the Department.
[13]. In addition, Department officials informed us that the express
exclusion of Special Counsel Fitzgerald from the application of 28 C.F.R.
Part 600, which contains provisions that might conflict with the notion
that the Special Counsel in this investigation possesses all the power
of the Attorney General, contributes to the Special Counsel's
independence.
[14] Thus, Special Counsel Fitzgerald need not follow the
Department's practices and procedures if they would subject him to the
approval of an officer or employee of the Department. For example, 28
C.F.R. 600.7 requires that a Special Counsel consult with the Attorney
General before taking particular actions."
[15]
The next paragraph graphically illustrates the recognition
by the GAO that Fitzgerald has all of the power of the Attorney General
for purposes of this investigation:
"The consulting requirement would seem to be inconsistent
with the notion that Special Counsel Fitzgerald possesses the plenary
authority of the Attorney General".[15]
The key word is "plenary"; as in unlimited or complete
authority.
The GAO then went on to discuss the legality of the Part 600 waver:
"The remaining issue is whether Part 600 can be waived by
the Attorney General or acting Attorney General. We examined Part 600
and found it was issued in 1999 to replace the procedures of the expired
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994. In our view, Part 600
is not a substantive (legal) limitation on the authority of the Acting
Attorney General to delegate departmental functions to Special Counsel
Fitzgerald. First, 28 C.F.R. 600.10 states that the regulations are "not
intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, by any person
or entity, in any matter, civil, criminal, or administrative." Further,
in the supplemental information accompanying the issuance of Part 600,
the Department explained that the effective date of the rule did not
have to be delayed 30 days after publication because it was not a
substantive rule, citing 5 U.S.C. 553(d), 552(a)(1)(D). 64 Fed. Reg.
37038, at 37041 (July 9, 1999).
Finally, the only statute cited as authority for 28 C.F.R. Part 600 that
expressly authorizes the Department to issue regulations is 5 U.S.C. 301
(2000)...The power conferred by 5 U.S.C. 301 is administrative and not
legislative...It follows that such regulations governing internal
procedures issued under this statute do not have the force and effect of
law... Thus, 28 C.F.R Part 600 does not act as a substantive limitation
on the Attorney General's (or Acting Attorney General's) authority to
delegate authority to a U.S. Attorney to serve as a Special Counsel to
investigate high ranking government officials and it may be waived..."
28 U.S.C. 510 states:
The Attorney General may from time to time make such
provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by
any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of
any function of the Attorney General.
The GAO decision discusses this and other provisions of
United States Code which allowed Comey to transfer his full authority as
Acting Attorney General for this matter:
"The Department was not limited by 28 C.F.R. Part 600
when it exercised its authority under 28 U.S.C. 508, 509, 510 and 515
and appointed Special Counsel Fitzgerald from within the Department to
investigate the alleged unauthorized leak of a CIA employee's
identity..."
And:
"Acting Attorney General Comey appointed Special Counsel
Fitzgerald under 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 515.
[16]... We agree with the
Department that the same statutory authorities that authorize the
Attorney General (or Acting Attorney General) to delegate authority to a
U.S. Attorney to investigate and prosecute high ranking government
officials are "other law" for the purposes of authorizing the Department
to finance the investigation and prosecution...[17]
WHY CAN'T FITZGERALD BE FIRED AS SPECIAL COUNSEL?
First, let me make it clear that Patrick Fitzgerald, while wearing the hat
of US Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, can indeed be fired
or replaced by President Bush. There's no doubt about that.
But Fitzgerald wears a different hat pertaining to Treasongate where he is
the "Special Counsel" "Acting" and vested with the "full authority" of the
"US Attorney General" to prosecute Treasongate. And as such, nobody in the
Department of Justice can touch him.
The main stream media mantra announcing that Fitzgerald's term as US
Attorney expires in October is completely irrelevant to the ongoing,
plenary mandate he has while wearing the hat of "Special Counsel" for
purposes of prosecuting Treasongate matters.
Not only was it Comey's intention to prepare Fitzgerald for the coming
assault on his legally mandated plenary authority by vesting him with
complete autonomous rule, but the GAO, through their approval of
"permanent indefinite appropriations" to perpetually fund Fitzgerald's
office, at the request of the Justice Department, has made a strong legal
argument, in Decision B-302582, that Fitzgerald has all of the protections
and authority normally granted to an independent prosecutor under the
expired independent counsel law.
The following passages are taken directly from
GAO Decision B-302582:
"Subject: Special Counsel and Permanent Indefinite
Appropriation
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is required to audit twice a
year the expenditures by independent counsels and certain special
counsels paid from the permanent indefinite appropriation.
[1] In the course of auditing independent counsel expenditures for
the period ending March 31, 2004, we learned that the Department of
Justice was using the permanent indefinite appropriation to pay the
expenses of the investigation by Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Fitzgerald continued to perform his duties as a U.S. Attorney after
his appointment as Special Counsel. This is the first time that the
expenses of an investigation by a United States Attorney appointed to
serve as Special Counsel who continues to serve as a United States
Attorney have been paid from the permanent indefinite appropriation. In
addition, Department of Justice regulations at 28 C.F.R. Part 600 (2003)
provide that Special Counsels shall be selected from outside the
government.
Given our responsibility to audit the fund, the use of the account to
finance Special Counsel Fitzgerald's activities, and the provisions of
28 C.F.R. Part 600 (2003), we initiated inquiries with the Department of
Justice to assure ourselves of the availability of this account to
defray his expenses.
[2] In considering this matter, we requested and received the
written views of the Department of Justice. We also met with officials
of the Department to discuss their views and obtained additional
comments and information. Finally, we reviewed the laws and their
legislative histories, regulations, court decisions, and past practices
of the Department of Justice, as they relate to this matter.
For the reasons discussed below, we do not object to the use of the
permanent indefinite appropriation to fund Special Counsel Fitzgerald's
expenses. Unlike the expired independent counsel law, the permanent
indefinite appropriation does not require that a Special Counsel be
appointed from outside the government. The Department, in appointing
Special Counsel Fitzgerald under "other law", has afforded him
independence by delegating all of the Attorney General's authority with
respect to the investigation and instructing him to exercise that
authority independent of the control of any officer of the
Department..."
There's no doubt, at least as far as the GAO is concerned,
that Fitzgerald has been vested with "all of the authority of the Attorney
General" and that he is also "independent of the control of any officer of
the Department".
McAllum can't touch him. Flanigan can't touch him. Gonzales certainly
can't touch him.
And the President can't touch him because the conflict of interest which
caused DOJ to appoint him in the first place has expanded exponentially.
Should President Bush try to fire Fitzgerald anyway, not only will the
political fall out be much greater than if an underling did the dirty
deed, but Fitzgerald could fight back on very solid legal ground using the
arguments set forth below from the GAO which analyzes Fitzgerald's
"Special Counsel" mandate as being similar to the mandate conveyed by the
expired Independent Counsel law. That law, I'm sure you will recall,
prohibited the President from wriggling out of an impeachment and possible
conviction by firing the Independent Counsel investigating him.
Let's hear from the GAO again:
"Following his appointment as Special Counsel, Mr.
Fitzgerald continued to perform his duties as United States Attorney. As
a result of our activities in connection with the audit of the
Independent Counsel expenditures for the six-month period ending March
31, 2004, we learned that the Department of Justice was charging the
expenses of Special Counsel Fitzgerald to the permanent indefinite
appropriation established ' . . . to pay all necessary expenses of
investigations and prosecutions by independent counsels appointed
pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 591 et seq . or other law . . .'
[5] In the following section we discuss two issues: whether the
permanent indefinite appropriation is available to fund Special Counsel
Fitzgerald's expenses and whether the Part 600 regulations, which among
other things require the appointment of Special Counsel from outside the
government, can be waived.
Discussion
As you are aware, the authority to appoint independent counsels pursuant
to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 591 et seq . expired on June 30, 1999.
However, the permanent indefinite appropriation remains available to pay
the expenses of an independent counsel (1) who was appointed by the
Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia pursuant to the provisions of 28U.S.C. 591 et seq. whose
investigation was underway when the law expired[6]
or
(2) who was appointed under "other law."[7]
Under the expired law, a person appointed as an independent counsel
could not hold "any office of profit or trust under the United States,
28 U.S.C. 593(b)(2) (2000)."
[8] The purpose of the qualification was to avoid the public
perception of an actual or apparent conflict of interest existing
between the investigator and those being investigated for alleged
violations of law.
[9]
The permanent indefinite appropriation is available to pay all necessary
expenses of investigations of independent counsels appointed under other
law. However, the term "independent counsel" is not defined in the
permanent indefinite appropriation. About the time the independent
counsel law was being considered for reauthorization in 1987, legal
challenges were underway regarding the constitutionality of the
procedure followed to appoint independent counsels. Consequently, to
avoid interruption of ongoing investigations should the law be ruled
unconstitutional by a court, the Attorney General appointed the same
persons to serve as independent counsels under the statutory authority
that was relied upon to appoint Special Counsel Fitzgerald.
[10] Thus, the independent counsels appointed under "other law"
around the time that the Congress was considering the Department of
Justice appropriation act for fiscal year 1988 (which enacted the
permanent indefinite appropriation into law) were the independent
counsels that also had been appointed in conformity with the
requirements of the independent counsel law.
[11]
That's big, really big.
Why?
Because it elaborates on precedent. And precedent is the backbone of our
legal system.
The expired independent counsel law barred the President from firing an
independent prosecutor. And here we have the GAO, citing legal precedent
in their approval of permanent indefinite appropriation to fund Special
Counsel Fitzgerald's investigation, and comparing him to the "independent
counsels that also had been appointed in conformity with the requirements
of the independent counsel law." They were all shielded from being fired
by the President until their work was done.
This isn't Citizen Spook creating the argument to sway people, it's the
GAO citing legal precedent to support a DOJ request for funds to finance
Fitzgerald's investigation. It was the Department of Justice who convinced
the GAO to recognize such precedent:
"In a meeting with Department of Justice officials,
[12] the Department explained its view that use of the permanent
indefinite appropriation to pay expenses of a U.S. Attorney appointed to
serve as Special Counsel who continues to perform his duty as a U.S.
Attorney is appropriate. The alleged violation that Special Counsel
Fitzgerald is investigating involves the rank and level of government
official that clearly would have been within the scope of the expired
independent counsel law and the investigation of which could have been
funded by the permanent indefinite appropriation. Additionally, the
Department views the use of the permanent indefinite appropriation as
important to facilitate Special Counsel Fitzgerald's investigation by
freeing him from possible budget constraints that potentially might
serve to limit his activities."
Holy crap batman. I can hear Ashcroft singing, let the
eagle soar.
How the hell are they going to spin their way out of that?
DOJ convinced the GAO that Special Counsel Fitzgerald's investigation was
so important that it's own DOJ regulations were not sufficient to
guarantee the necessary independence to guarantee the proper integrity:
Since the permanent indefinite appropriation is available
for independent counsels, we looked for indicia of independence of
Special Counsel Fitzgerald...In addition, Department officials informed
us that the express exclusion of Special Counsel Fitzgerald from the
application of 28 C.F.R. Part 600, which contains provisions that might
conflict with the notion that the Special Counsel in this investigation
possesses all the power of the Attorney General, contributes to the
Special Counsel's independence."
[14]
And
finally, the GAO's conclusion:
Conclusion
Upon review and consideration, we do not object to the Department's
determination that the permanent indefinite appropriation is available
to pay the expenses of Special Counsel Fitzgerald's investigation.
Admittedly one might infer from events occurring around the time that
the Congress was considering establishing the permanent indefinite
appropriation that it was within the Congress' contemplation that the
appropriation would be used to pay the expenses of an independent
counsel possessing the degree of independence similar to that possessed
by an independent counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. 591 et seq. However,
such an inference is insufficient to support our reading into the law a
limitation on the use of the permanent indefinite appropriation to pay
for investigations solely by Special Counsels appointed from outside the
government. The independence conferred by the delegation of authority to
Special Counsel Fitzgerald from the Department of Justice is consistent
with a fair reading of the independence required of an "independent
counsel" appointed under "other law." Finally, Part 600 regulations do
not have the force and effect of law and may be waived by the
Department. Thus we do not view the payment of the expenses associated
with Special Counsel Fitzgerald's investigation from the permanent
indefinite appropriation to be improper or unauthorized simply because
he was not appointed from outside the government and continues to serve
as a United States Attorney."
Yeah,
what he said. That's what I'm talkin' about.
The GAO was presented with a concept for precedent by the Department of
Justice. DOJ requested Special Counsel Fitzgerald's office receive funding
by the GAO based upon an argument, made by DOJ, that Fitzgerald, because
of the independence and plenary authority mandated to him, should be
treated just like an independent counsel with all the protection of the
expired independent counsel act. DOJ supported their position with legal
precedent which was further accepted and reinforced by the decision of the
GAO.
How can they come back now, after making the argument that Fitzgerald
should have all of the independence and financing of independent counsels
appointed under the expired independent counsel law, to argue that Special
Counsel Fitzgerald should not have that same independence as to the issue
of whether the President or anybody at DOJ can fire him or even limit his
jurisdiction and plenary authority?
They can't.
But should they try anyway, Fitzgerald can destroy them in court by
entering into evidence the documentation clarifying the DOJ mindset with
regards to their lobbying of the GAO for permanent indefinite
appropriation to fund Special Counsel Fitzgerald's investigations.
Simply put, DOJ cannot reverse themselves on the issue of Fitzgerald's
plenary authority and independence just because he's getting too close to
possible indictments/convictions of the people he was specifically
empowered by DOJ to investigate.
And just in case you were wondering, check out the results of the GAO's
audit of Fitzgerald's investigation:
"We
audited the statement of expenditures for the Office of Special Counsel
Fitzgerald and found that (1) the statement of expenditures was presented
fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles, (2) the Special Counsel had effective
internal control over financial reporting and compliance with laws and
regulations, and (3) there was no reportable noncompliance with laws and
regulations we tested."
[15]
BACK TO THE COMEY PRESS CONFERENCE
Comey was asked at the December 30, 2003,
press conference
two questions regarding whether Fitzgerald could be removed. His answers
are very interesting:
Q:
Could you fire Fitzgerald?
MR.
COMEY: That's a great question. (Laughter.) Now I believe that I could
revoke the delegation of authority that I've given to him. I don't believe
that I could -
He appears to believe he could revoke
the delegation of authority, but that he couldn't outright fire him. The
answer is clearly nebulous. Comey even says, "That's a great question". He
never says equivocally whether he could remove Fitzgerald. He appears to
be waffling.
But this press
conference took place on December 30, 2003. "Decision
B-was dated September 30, 2004. Comey
wasn't sure back on December 30, 2003, whether or not he could remove
Fitzgerald or even limit his authority. But since that time, DOJ created a
very convincing argument for their presentation to the GAO. The GAO bought
that argument hook, line and sinker agreeing that Fitzgerald has all of
the protection and authority granted by the expired independent counsel
law. This means his office of the Special Counsel is legally protected
from interference by anybody at DOJ, President Bush or anybody else that
breathes air on planet Earth.
One last comment from Comey's press
conference:
Q: If you don't like what he's
doing, you can end it
MR. COMEY:
Well, in theory, if I know what he's doing, in theory I could, yeah. And
I'd better have a darn good reason for doing it, because you'd have your
hands in the air
It's a fair
answer. I'm sure if Fitzgerald was up to something illegal, he could be
fired, just as an independent counsel acting under the expired independent
counsel law could have been fired were they to engage in criminal
behavior. Comey says, "in theory", but no such theory has been tested by
Fitzgerald. According to the Government Office of Accountability,
Fitzgerald is totally clean.
Comey's final
words on this issue are very interesting. What does he mean by "you'd have
your hands in the air"? That's spooky. And it's something DOJ and
President Bush really ought to think about.
citizenspook@hotmail.com
http://citizenspook.blogspot.com/2005/08/treasongate-us-attorney-generals.html
The Controlling Law - Big Trouble
For The White House Staff
The Controlling Law, Part 2: THE DEATH PENALTY, 18 USC 794
and the shift from GWOT to GSAVE
Total Media BLACK OUT of 18 USC 794, Federal Espionage Statute
How The White House, Wilson, Novak,
Corn & Plame Conspired
The Federal Grand Jury, FOURTH BRANCH
of the US Government
The US Attorney General's Office AND President Bush
Have NO
LEGAL AUTHORITY To Remove Patrick Fitzgerald As Special Counsel
The Challenge of 18 USC 794...
Prior High Profile Convictions Under 18 USC 794
US Court of Appeals: Special Counsel's Showing Decides
The Case
Iraq War fraud could lead to State court prosecutions for murder of
American soldiers
NIGER DOCUMENT FRAUD --Wilson and Plame May Be on
Fitzgerald's Radar for Treason Related to the Niger Document Conspiracy
Wilson Is In Cahoots With Bush Crime Family
Project Perfect Storm:
Citizen Activism against Felony Murder Resulting
from Fraud that Led to the Iraq War
July 18th Chicago Subway/Dirksen Federal Courthouse
Bomb plot
involving British MI6 assets -Part 1:Chicago Police Implicated in Cover
up?
July 18 Chicago Subway/Dirksen Federal Courthouse
Plot
Involving British MI6-Part 2: CTA Officials Deny Chicago Police Accounts
