US Court of Appeals: Special Counsel's Showing Decides The Case
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Citizen Spook Wednesday, August 24, 2005 Individuals within the Bush Administration revealed the identity of CIA operative, Valerie Plame in contravention of US statutes. But there has been an intentional misdirection in claiming that the law that was violated is "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" of 1982. Four high profile cases have been founded on the statute, United States Code, 18 USC 794. ***************************
While Joe
Wilson, who still hasn't mentioned the hovering ominous specter of 18 USC
794, is in damage control mode cowardly hiding behind the bravery of Cindy
Sheehan, and Judith Miller continues to whine about being put in jail for
protecting criminals and crimes, I thought it would make good reading to
summarize the incendiary 83 page opinion issued by The US Court of Appeals
(D.C. Circuit),
IN RE: GRAND JURY SUBPOENA, JUDITH MILLER
so you can have some judicial perspective from the three judge appellate
tribunal as to the seriousness of the crimes Fitzgerald is pursuing. "In his opinion below, the Chief District Judge held that "a reporter called to testify before a grand jury regarding confidential information enjoys no First Amendment protection." In Re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004). Appellants argue that "this proposition of law is flatly contrary to the great weight of authority in this and other circuits." Appellants are wrong. The governing authority in this case, as the District Court correctly held, comes not from this or any other circuit, but the Supreme Court of the United States. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the highest Court considered and rejected the same claim of First Amendment privilege on facts materially indistinguishable from those at bar. " The court further stated on page 10-12:
All of the
Judges concurred that there was no 1st Amendment exemption for the press. The Court is not of one mind on the existence of a common law privilege.
Judge Sentelle would hold that there is no such common law privilege for
reasons set forth in a separate opinion. Judge Tatel would hold that there
is such a common law privilege. Judge Henderson believes that we need not,
and therefore should not, reach that question. However, all believe that
if there is any such privilege, it is not absolute and may be overcome by
an appropriate showing.
All further
believe, for the reasons set forth in the separate opinion of Judge Tatel,
that if such a privilege applies here, it has been overcome. Therefore,
the common law privilege, even if one exists, does not warrant reversal.
C. Due Process While appellants insist that their privilege is absolute, they assert a secondary line of argument that if their privilege is conditional, then their due process rights have been violated by the refusal of the Special Counsel and the District Court to provide them access to the Special Counsel's secret evidentiary submissions in support of the enforcement of the subpoenas. This argument is without merit. Regarding the power and independent authority of the federal grand jury, the Court of Appeals had this to say on page 17: As the Supreme Court has reminded us on occasion, "the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). The function of that separate institution is to "serv[e] as a kind of buffer or referee between the government and the people." Id.
D. Department
of Justice Guidelines In their final argument for reversal of the District Court's contempt finding, appellants contend that the Special Counsel did not comply with the Department of Justice guidelines for issuing subpoenas to news media and that such failure provides an independent basis for reversal. The District Court expressed its doubt that the DOJ guidelines were enforceable, but found that even if they were, Special Counsel had fully complied with the guidelines. Because we conclude that the guidelines create no enforceable right, we need not reach the question of the Special Counsel's compliance. The guidelines in question are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 and the United States Attorney's Manual, § 9-2.161. Those guidelines provide that subpoenas for testimony by news media must be approved by the Attorney General, a requirement not pertinent in the present case as the Special Counsel had received delegation of all the Attorney General's authority... "
Somebody give
that man a cigar. It's been judicially confirmed, Fitzgerald has all of
the power of the Attorney General for the purposes of prosecuting
Treasongate crimes. SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, concurring: As noted in the opinion of the court, I write separately to express my differing basis for affirming the District Court on the common law privilege issue...[A]ny such privilege enjoyed by the reporters has been overcome by the showing of the United States... " Judge Henderson agreed and elaborated (from page 34): Because my colleagues and I agree that any federal common-law reporter's privilege that may exist is not absolute and that the Special Counsel's evidence defeats whatever privilege we may fashion, we need not, and therefore should not, decide anything more today than that the Special Counsel's evidentiary proffer overcomes any hurdle, however high, a federal common-law reporter's privilege may erect." From page 35, footnote 2: Is the Special Counsel's evidentiary proffer sufficient to overcome any qualified privilege that may exist? Because we agree that the answer is "yes," there is no need for us to go any further. " And then the blockbuster quote: While I am convinced that we need not, and therefore should not, go further than to conclude, as did the district court, see Appendix 35-36, 275, that the Special Counsel's showing decides the case... "
That's a big
quote there. It's so big, I don't even know what it means. And I think the
Judge may have intended to be as coy as the quote suggests. And if I'm
right about that, hang on to your hat, America, this is going to be quote
a thrill ride. TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: This case involves a clash between two truth-seeking institutions: the grand jury and the press. On the one hand, the grand jury, a body "deeply rooted in Anglo-American history" and guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, see United States v.Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1974), holds "broad powers" to collect evidence through judicially enforceable subpoenas. See United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1983). "Without thorough and effective investigation, the grand jury would be unable either to ferret out crimes deserving of prosecution, or to screen out charges not warranting prosecution." Id. at 424. On the other hand, the press, shielded by the First Amendment, "has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965). Using language we have quoted with approval, see Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit aptly described this conflict between press freedom and the rule of law: "Freedom of the press, hard-won over the centuries by men of courage, is basic to a free society. But basic too are courts of justice, armed with the power to discover truth. The concept that it is the duty of a witness to testify in a court of law has roots fully as deep in our history as does the guarantee of a free press." Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958). Because I agree that the balance in this case, which involves the alleged exposure of a covert agent, favors compelling the reporters' testimony, I join the judgment of the court. Tatel went on to fashion a balancing test, one that recognized a special common law exemption that would protect the press from revealing sources under certain circumstances. From page 69: In short, the question in this case is whether Miller's and Cooper's sources released information more harmful than newsworthy. Then Tatel applied the test to the facts (page 70): Applying this standard to the facts of this case, and considering first only the public record, I have no doubt that the leak at issue was a serious matter. Authorized "to investigate and prosecute violations of any federal criminal laws related to the underlying alleged unauthorized disclosure, as well as federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, [his] investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses,"see Letter from James B. Comey, Acting Attorney General, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois (Feb. 6, 2004), the special counsel is attempting to discover the origins of press reports describing Valerie Plame as a CIA operative monitoring weapons of mass destruction. See majority op. at 3-5.
Before
returning to Tatel's opinion, it's interesting to note that Tatel, along
with the other two circuit judges, do not limit their discussion to the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Tatel appears to be concerned with
"violations of any federal criminal laws related to the underlying alleged
unauthorized disclosure." If the Court of Appeals is not limiting its
discussion to the IIPA, why the hell is Joe Wilson and the main strema
media limiting their discussion to the IIPA? An alleged covert agent, Plame evidently traveled overseas on clandestine
missions beginning nearly two decades ago. See, e.g., Richard Leiby & Dana
Priest, The Spy Next Door; Valerie Wilson, Ideal Mom, Was Also the Ideal
Cover, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 2003, at A1. Her exposure, therefore, not only
may have jeopardized any covert activities of her own, but also may have
endangered friends and associates from whom she might have gathered
information in the past...
Voluminous
classified findings? Hey now. In sum, based on an exhaustive investigation, the special counsel has established the need for Miller's and Cooper's testimony. Thus, considering the gravity of the suspected crime and the low value of the leaked information, no privilege bars the subpoenas. Judge Tatel concluded (from pages 82-83): I conclude, as I began, with the tensions at work in this case. Here, two
reporters and a news magazine, informants to the public, seek to keep a
grand jury uninformed. Representing two equally fundamental
principles-rule of law and free speech-the special counsel and the
reporters both aim to facilitate fully informed and accurate
decision-making by those they serve: the grand jury and the electorate. To
this court falls the task of balancing the two sides' concerns. Where is the main stream media in reporting this decision? It's fairly frightening, America. The free press is long gone down the road to perdition. The main stream media, by its calculated decision to ignore the very damning language of this court, and its unwillingness to cover 18 USC 794, has proven itself to be nothing more than the Government's bureau of propaganda.
As long as the
press sticks to the script, "Wilson was smeared, but the IIPA was not
violated", the press is allowed to hammer away, as yesterday's
regurgitated LA Times recap makes witness to (a report which added nothing
new to the matter and was only issued as cover for the blogosphere truth
bombs being exploded all over this case). Deviations from that script do
not seem to be allowed.
It would take
the average citizen a long time to sift through everything I've written on
the Treasongate crimes. Adding anything else to this analysis would only
serve to confuse more than clarify. If the readership of CS thinks this
information is important, do something with it. I don't think I can add
anymore to the debate.
The rabbit hole
is so deep and wide, I'm not sure what our chances of escape are. I don't
know if the press will ever be there for the people again. The Supreme Court went on to observe that "freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right . . . not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.'" Id. (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 304 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938)). Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters employed by Time Magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend that protection as well to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly newsletter to inform his neighbors, lodge brothers, co-religionists, or co-conspirators? Perhaps more to the point today, does the privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical "blogger" sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not? How could one draw a distinction consistent with the court's vision of a broadly granted personal right? If so, then would it not be possible for a government official wishing to engage in the sort of unlawful leaking under investigation in the present controversy to call a trusted friend or a political ally, advise him to set up a web log (which I understand takes about three minutes) and then leak to him under a promise of confidentiality the information which the law forbids the official to disclose?... From pages 32-33: If the court extends the privilege only to a defined group of reporters, are we in danger of creating a "licensed" or "established" press? If we do so, have we run afoul of the breadth of the freedom of the press, that "fundamental personal right" for which the Court in Branzburg expressed its concern? 408 U.S. at 704. " The Controlling Law - Big Trouble For The White House Staff The Controlling Law, Part 2: THE DEATH PENALTY, 18 USC 794 and the shift from GWOT to GSAVE Total Media BLACK OUT of 18 USC 794, Federal Espionage Statute How The White House, Wilson, Novak, Corn & Plame Conspired The Federal Grand Jury, FOURTH BRANCH of the US Government The Challenge of 18 USC 794... Prior High Profile Convictions Under 18 USC 794 US Court of Appeals: Special Counsel's Showing Decides The Case Iraq War fraud could lead to State court prosecutions for murder of American soldiers
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